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"Doctors are led to prescribe drugs that may not be necessarily worth
the money, may not be better than a generic that's already on the mar-
ket and that their patients don't need. It's clearly contributing to the
rising costs of prescription drugs and health care."'
-Dr. Arnold S. Relman, professor emeritus at
Harvard Medical School and former editor
of the New England Journal of Medicine
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Spending on pharmaceuticals is the fastest growing expense in the
health care industry, and many in the medical community contribute this
fiscal rise to the pharmaceutical industry's emphasis on direct-to-con-
sumer advertising.3 Many physicians claim that direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising leads to inappropriate prescribing; or on the other hand,
physicians are forced to spend extra time with patients explaining the in-
formation presented by the advertisers and clarifying the drug's
indications.4
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1. See Melody Petersen, Madison Ave. Has Growing Role in the Business of Drug
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at Al (quoting Dr. Relman's response to the question
of whether science has been sacrificed for the success of advertisement).
2. Id. (commenting on the inappropriate advertising frenzy of pharmaceutical drugs).
3. See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498, 499-501 (2002) (finding that direct-to-consumer drug advertise-
ments increased 212% between the years 1996 to 2000, with the greatest percentage in-
crease in television advertisements, which increased seven-fold).
4. See id. (discussing the potential drawbacks and costs imposed on physicians when a
patient is misinformed and requests an inappropriate treatment based on a drug
advertisement).
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This comment addresses pharmaceutical drug direct-to-consumer ad-
vertisements, and the manipulation of the consumer public through the
manufacturer's marketing practices. This comment will focus primarily
on how direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements impact the
innocent and unwitting consumer: the portrayal of a world with low-risk
life-style enhancers, and the depiction of a society where a cure for any
symptom or unpleasant emotion is only a prescription away.
Also addressed will be the influence that a patent life has on a manu-
facturer's decision to advertise the drug to consumers. Included in this
discussion will be the marketing tactic of promoting one drug as superior
to another, where the newly promoted drug is simply a revamped version
of the older drug. It is questionable whether the lay consumer audience
is conscious of this "improved" product promotion, when the newly mar-
keted drug is simply a tweaked version of the original, either reformu-
lated or further indicated in order to extend the drug's patent life.
Finally, this comment will focus on the changes that should be made in
the world of prescription drug manufacturer liability. With an analysis of
the tobacco industry's liability resulting from direct-to-consumer tobacco
product advertisements, this comment will compare pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer liability with that of tobacco manufacturers. This comment sug-
gests that courts reassess the learned intermediary doctrine. The learned
intermediary doctrine constructs an exception for drug manufacturers, al-
lowing them to bypass the traditional products-liability rule that a manu-
facturer must inform purchasers of the product's potential risks; thus
permitting a pharmaceutical manufacturer to omit a drug's risks when
addressing consumers.5 Further, this comment reasons that the use of
incentive-based regulations to govern direct-to-consumer drug advertis-
ing should replace the learned intermediary doctrine. This proposition
relies on the tobacco industry's success of avoiding liability in the absence
of such regulation, all at the expense of the consumer.6
II. PRESCRIPION DRUG ADVERTISEMENTS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS
Historically, pharmaceutical companies developed and directed their
entire product marketing promotion and education to physicians and
health-care providers responsible for prescribing the manufacturers'
5. Dabney J. Carr, IV & Bryony H. Bowers, Recent Developments in Learned Inter-
mediary Doctrine, THE BRIEF, ABA TORT & INS. PRACTICE SECTION, 2002, at 20.
6. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Re-
sponse to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 294 (2000) (asserting
that the proven success of the tobacco industry at manipulating consumers is sufficient
evidence in favor of forcing manufacturers who currently fall short in apprising consumers
of the risks involved with a product to redirect those efforts into strengthening such
awareness).
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products.7 Now, though, pharmaceutical companies consider direct-to-
consumer drug advertisements to be educational segments that provide
consumers with health care information and choices.8 Although many
physicians feel that drug ads entice patients into believing that a pill can
treat any symptom,9 a survey by the National Medical Association found
that there are some physicians who agree that drug advertisements may
benefit the viewer by enlightening them about troublesome symptoms.' °
Yet a third group of doctors stated that they often felt pressured by pa-
tients to write a prescription for a particular brand name drug.11
A health care entity openly opposed to direct-to-consumer drug adver-
tisements is Blue Cross and Blue Shield, which contends that highly mar-
keted brand name drugs often work equally as well as older drugs and
treatments.' 2 For example, a clinical study found that the majority of pa-
tients with arthritis could be treated just as effectively with ibuprofen as
with Vioxx, which costs a few dollars a day.13 Instead, the manufacturers
of Vioxx have advertised the drug tremendously, creating a demand for
the pricey product in place of ibuprofen, which costs only pennies a day. 4
7. See Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999) (holding that
pharmaceutical manufacturers who advertised the efficacy of their product directly to con-
sumers were not relieved of liability by simply informing prescribing physicians of the risks
involved).
8. See Jeff Gelles, Prescription-Drug Ads Prompt Cheers, Fears; Onslaught of TV
Commercials May Nudge People to Go See Their Doctors, or it Might Lead to Abuse, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at A2, available at 1997 WL 3251794; Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-
Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 166 (1999) (addressing
the views of direct-to-consumer advertisement advocates).
9. See Lauran Neergaard, TV Advertising Effective for Drug Companies, AUGUSTA
CHRONICLE, May 1, 2002, available at http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/050102/tec-
124-8492.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2003) (quoting FDA drug chief, Dr. Janet Woodcock,
who questions whether the nation's barrage of drug ads has caused patients to receive
inappropriate prescriptions).
10. See id. (citing a recent survey of the National Medical Association's African-
American physician members who feel African-Americans are less likely to see a doctor
for a host of diseases).
11. Id.
12. See Alexandra Marks, Rise of 'Ask Your Doctor' Ads: A Public-Health Concern?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/
1120/p2s2-ussc.html.
13. Id. (discussing anecdotal evidence of the rise in people asking their doctors for
medications that they do not always need).
14. See NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND
MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING (2000), available at http://www.nihcm.org (detailing drug man-
ufacturers' spending on direct-to-consumer ads, finding Merck to have spent the most in
2000: $160.8 million advertising Vioxx in 2000, with sales quadrupling between 1999 and
2000); See also Marks, supra note 12 (stating that Vioxx sales have increased steadily with
the drug's advertisements).
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In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initiated new guide-
lines for direct-to-consumer advertising with the intention of increasing
"consumer access to prescription drug information."' 5 Unfortunately,
the FDA has imparted more direct-to-consumer marketing opportunities
for pharmaceutical manufacturers than it probably anticipated. 6 Rather
than increasing consumer understanding, drug companies have increased
their access to consumers.' 7
The FDA implemented new guidelines in response to the tremendous
volume of promotion by drug manufacturers, requiring direct-to-con-
sumer drug advertisements to include tedious fine print product warnings
and indications.18 To reduce the amount of intricate information re-
quired in a commercial segment, the FDA established more lenient rules
for televised drug advertisements, allowing pharmaceutical companies to
broadcast brand name drugs and benefits while specifying only the most
prevalent side effects.1 9 The regulation allows broadcast advertisers to
side step the presentation of all the drug's side effects and contraindica-
tions through the use of the alternative provision requirement."0 This ex-
ception allows pharmaceutical companies to provide a toll-free number,
refer to a printed advertisement or brochure of the drug, state the need to
see a medical professional, and/or supply an internet web page address
instead of furnishing complex reactionary information."
Thinking back to the first direct-to-consumer drug advertisement, both
in print and on television - Upjohn's Rogaine hair loss treatment prod-
uct" - and the onslaught of drug advertisements that followed, it is sur-
prising that more people are not walking around with full heads of hair.
Turn on the television and it will not be long before a commercial comes
on displaying a person who asked his or her doctor for a particular medi-
cation: Paxil for social anxiety disorder, Viagra for erectile dysfunction,
15. Kelly N. Reeves, Note, Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertising: Empowering
the Consumer or Manipulating a Vulnerable Population?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 661, 679
(1998).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 & 43,172 (Aug., 12, 1997).
19. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1).
20. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., Gui-
DANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 2-4 (1999),
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/advrts.pdf; William E. Holtz, Consumer-Directed Prescrip-
tion Drug Advertising: Effects on Public Health, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 206-08 (1999).
21. Id.; Holtz, supra note 20, at 206.
22. See Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the Bur-
den When Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,
21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1997).
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Vioxx for orthopedic pain, Prilosec for acid reflux, Claritin for allergies,
and the list goes on.2 3
Guaranteed results from the advertised drug's use is never the end goal
of pharmaceutical advertising; the objective is to increase profits by stim-
ulating consumer demand.24 The health information supplied by drug
companies in prescription drug commercials may seem helpful on its face,
but "drug companies operate in a for-profit, market-driven environ-
ment. '2 Therefore, it is difficult for drug manufacturers to justify direct-
to-consumer advertisements as a public service when the bottom line is
increased market-share. 26
Because increasing demand is the intention of all marketing campaigns,
"a drug ad [will not] discuss other medications. . . it [will not] discuss
alternative treatments; it [will not] discuss the wisdom of doing nothing
for a while; and it [cannot] diagnose an illness.",2 1 Consumer advocates
claim this barrage of drug advertisements has resulted in patients de-
manding brand name prescriptions in place of less expensive, older, but
reliable, medications.28
With the goal of increasing market share through increased consumer
demand,29 direct-to-consumer prescription drug commercials take the
consumer-viewer on a virtual tour of life-enhancing drug products. To-
day, pharmaceutical companies spend over an estimated one billion dol-
lars a year on drug advertisements directed at consumers, including
television commercials, periodical advertisements, internet websites, and
radio spots.3 ° This practice has resulted in an exponential increase in
consumer demand for and spending on prescription drugs that the phar-
23. RICHARD FRANK, PH.D., ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN Di-
RECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 11 (2002) (survey listing the
prescription drugs with the highest spending on direct-to-consumer advertising).
24. See Tyler & Cooper, supra note 22, at 1073.
25. Reeves, supra note 15.
26. Id.
27. Gelles, supra note 8.
28. Rita Rubin, Spotlight Falls on Drug Ads; Does Song and Dance Drive Sales, or
Give Public Vital Information?, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2001, at D9, available at 2001 WL
5478364.
29. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1451 (1999) (stating that "no
force exerts a more significant influence on manufacturer behavior than the force of the
market"; regardless of administrative rules and morality, advertiser manipulation of a
product's risks is rooted in the market).
30. Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 98
(2002).
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maceutical manufacturers could not acquire through physician-only prod-
uct promotion."
III. IMPACT ON THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
"Dr. Bradford Pontz can always spot the patient who has seen - and
been sold on - a commercial for a prescription drug.,32
The creation by the pharmaceutical industry of a "feel good" world has
the potential to burden the fiduciary physician-patient relationship. Re-
ferring to the trust and confidence seeded in the physician-patient rela-
tionship, one court has stated: "As part of this relationship, both parties
envision that the patient will rely on the judgment and expertise of the
physician."33 With the ever-increasing promotion of prescription drug
advertisements, physicians now have to decipher whether a patient is re-
lating subjective symptoms or regurgitating what he or she has seen in a
commercial or advertisement. 34
Studies have demonstrated that the warnings presented in direct-to-
consumer drug commercials are only partially digested by consumers,
leaving the viewer with an overall perception that the advertised ailment
is safely treatable, and not with the feeling that there is the possibility
that the treatment may be unsafe or inappropriate in many cases.35 The
31. See Mae Joanne Rosok, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs:
After a Decade of Speculation, Courts Consider Another Exception to the Learned Interme-
diary Rule, 24 SEAFI-LE U. L. REV. 629, 657, 660 (2000) (stating that the direct-to-consumer
advertising result is the destruction of the patient-doctor relationship); Barry R. Furrow,
Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy: The Doctor, The Hospital, The
Pharmacy, and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 426 (1996) (stating that direct-to-
consumer advertising is motivated by drug company determinations that they can reach
potential customers more rapidly than by waiting for physicians to pass the information to
their patients, i.e. consumers).
32. Jackie Judd, Truth in Advertising?, ABCNEWs.COM, Jan. 4, 2001, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/WorldNewsTonight/wnt010103-prescriptiondrugs-ads-fea-
ture.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) (quoting Dr. Pontz, who made the statement on Jan.
3, 2001, in regard to pharmaceutical drug advertising, with the doctor further stating that
he recommends to his patients that they view the drug ads with the same amount of skepti-
cism that they would with other advertised products).
33. Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991).
34. See W. John Thomas, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Catalyst for
a Change in the Therapeutic Model in Psychotherapy?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1999)
(addressing the issues created for a psychiatrist in the patient diagnostic experience as a
result of the evolution of pharmaceutical advertising).
35. See Tyler & Cooper, supra note 22, at 1096 (stating consumers are more likely to
interpret advice to consult a health-care professional as general reassurance that their
symptoms are treatable); Prescription Drug Products; Patient Labeling Requirements, 60
Fed. Reg. 44194 (Aug. 24, 1995) (demonstrating problems with consistency in information
disclosures to consumers through literature enclosed in drug packaging).
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end result has been a great resistance by the medical community to di-
rect-to-consumer drug advertisements, particularly because physicians
are trained to provide for the best interest of their patients, not drug
companies. 36
The medical community has voiced its belief that direct-to-consumer
drug advertisements "create an inappropriate demand for medications
and/or a demand for inappropriate medications. ' 37 Although some phy-
sicians see some positive effects of direct-to-consumer advertisements,
many physicians have expressed great concern about the fact that drug
manufacturers are inflating patients' expectations, by circumventing the
doctors responsible for prescribing the medications.38 In response to the
benefit-detriment effect of direct-to-consumer prescription drug adver-
tisements, one American Medical Association delegate stated, "The big
issue is medication by demand vs. [sic] medication by need... the more
knowledge the patient gets, the better it is. On the other hand, the adver-
tising 'de-professionalizes' the profession to some degree. '39
Many physicians provide drug prescriptions to patients based on the
patient's demand for the product, knowing that the patient will go else-
where if the doctor refuses.4n Many physicians would prefer to explain
and demonstrate to the patient that a particular drug treatment is not
necessary; or if a treatment is appropriate, that a drug that has been on
the market for a longer period of time has a proven track record of being
safe and effective compared to the new and highly advertised product.41
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are bombarding the consumer-patient
population with the benefits of their drugs, while minimizing the risks as
much as possible, and all the while leaving the physician with the title role
36. See Tyler & Cooper, supra note 22, at 1099-1100 (referencing an FDA moratorium
on drug advertising during which time it studied opposition to direct-to-consumer
advertisements).
37. Id. at 1098 (quoting from Prescription Drug Advertising Direct to the Consumer,
88 PEDIATRICS 174, 175 (1991)).
38. Robert Steyer, Do Drug Ads Educate or Mislead Consumers?, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, June 20, 1999, at A9, available at 1999 WL 302399.
39. See id. (quoting Dr. Arthur Gale, an internist, who was addressing the impact drug
advertisements have on public health and the physician-patient relationship).
40. See Stephen J. Gilbride, DTC Advertising One Year Later, DRUG Topics, Mar. 1,
1999, at 13 (quoting a doctor who stated, "I've lost patients because I refused to prescribe
what was in the ad").
41. See Sandy Rovner, Healthtalk: The Rx for Prescription Ads, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
1984, at B5, available at 1984 WL 2020342 (addressing an American Medical Association
policy stating that no evidence to date existed that revealed direct-to-consumer advertise-
ments would result in improved quality of medical care).
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of "learned intermediary., 42 Based on the legitimate right of a medical
doctor to determine what information a patient can or will benefit from
and understand, it is illogical to assume that pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers are in the position to overstep a physician's prescribing prerogative.
Many physicians choose not to disclose all the risks involved with the use
of a medication, or any treatment, reasoning that a patient's knowledge
of such information is not needed for a patient's informed consent.43
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISEMENTS ON CONSUMERS
"[C]ritics worry that the success of drug makers and marketers in
spurring big sales shortly after a drug's approval means that millions
of patients may take a drug before all of its side effects are known. ,4
Prescription drug television commercials display before-and-after sce-
narios of symptoms a patient may experience prior to taking the adver-
tised drug and the dramatic improvement in life after using the product.
This experience may create, whether consciously or not, a desire in the
consumer to experience pre-treatment symptoms in order to require the
recommended course of therapy.45
The FDA guidelines for prescription drug television advertisements re-
quire the inclusion of information about the major risks associated with
the use of the drug,4 6 and the advertisement must include a brief sum-
mary detailing the means by which the consumer can obtain the product's
labeling provisions.4 7 During a prescription drug commercial, the state-
42. See Tyler & Cooper, supra note 22, at 1095-96 (addressing how direct-to-consumer
drug advertisements undermine the physician-patient relationship and the learned inter-
mediary doctrine).
43. See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (holding that a physician's
duty to disclose treatment specifics is "limited to those disclosures which a reasonable
medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances").
44. See Petersen, supra note 1 (demonstrating that direct-to-consumer drug advertise-
ments may result in billion-dollar profits, but often at the expense of the unknowing
consumer).
45. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1438 (hypothesizing that marketing of products
directly to consumer results in the artificial creation of needs, or at the very least, direct-to-
consumer marketing results in more than merely informing the consumer).
46. See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements;
Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171 & 43,172 (Aug. 12, 1997) (stating prescription drug adver-
tisements on radio, television, or telephone must include information about major risks of
the advertised product). The FDA requires a statement to include information about the
major side effects and contraindications of the drug; it does not require the statement to
define the drug's effectiveness. Id.
47. See id. The brief summary for obtaining the drug's prescribing information must
be the use of the following: providing a toll-free number, a reference to a printed ad or
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ment about the drug's side effects is often done against the visual back-
drop of people engaged in life-affirming activities,48 such as playing with
a child,49 exercising,5 ° or socializing.51 In spite of the repetitive positive
visual graphics presented to the public, the FDA sends out approximately
one hundred citation letters a year to drug manufacturers, stipulating that
the companies make changes to their drug commercials and printed ad-
vertisements. 52 The FDA sends citation letter to drug companies when
the "ads stretch the truth with overstated claims of effectiveness and un-
derstated descriptions of side effects.",53 The makers of the arthritis drug
Celebrex, for example, were cited three times prior to the year 2001 for
making false claims on direct-to-consumer advertisements.54 The makers
of Claritin, a drug for the treatment of allergies, were cited ten times
between 1997 and 2001 for inaccurate sales pitches.
brochure accessible in public locations, a statement to ask a physician or pharmacist, and
an internet website. Id.
48. See Elizabeth A. Rothermich et al., Health-Related Quality of Life Claims in Pre-
scription Drug Advertisements, 53 AM. J. HEALTH SYST. PHARM. 1565, 1567 (1996) (stating
that 84% of the ninety-four drug advertisements studied, 84% contained implicit health-
related quality of life claims and 16% contained explicit referrals to health-related quality
of life claims).
49. See, e.g., Asthma Control That Can Help You Breathe Easier (Merck: Singulair
advertisement), at http://www.singulair.com/montelukast-sodium/singulair/consumer/
adultasthma/tvads/watch our tv ads.jsp (last visited Mar. 14, 2003) (promoting Singular
for the treatment of asthma).
50. See, e.g., Dan's Story (Merck: Zocor advertisement), at http://www.zocor.com/sim
vastatin/zocor/consumer/danreeves/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 14, 2003) (endorsing the
cholesterol lowering benefits of taking Zocor and exercising after coronary artery bypass
surgery); see also Pharmacia Pfizer: Celexa advertisement (ABC television commercial,
Aug. 2002) (promoting Celexa for the treatment of depression).
51. See e.g. GlaxoSmithKline: Paxil advertisement (NBC television commercial, Aug.
2002) (promoting Paxil for the treatment of depression and anxiety disorders); see gener-
ally THE GLAXOSMITHKLINE GROUP OF COMPANIES, PAXILCR: YOUR LIFE IS WAITING
(2002) (company pamphlet sketching out the Paxil commercial for depression).
52. Judd, supra note 32.
53. See id. (quoting Tom Abrams, the FDA's watchdog for deceptive advertising, who
continued to emphasize that drug advertisements are coupled with images of active people
with promises of relief, leaving consumers with the belief that drugs are more effective
than they really are).
54. See Letter from Spencer Salis, Pharm.D., Regulatory Review Officer Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications, Food and Drug Administration, to
Jerome M. Prahl, Associate Director of Regulatory Affairs, G.D. Searle & Co. (Nov. 14,
2000) (citing the makers of Celebrex for overstating the drug's efficacy); Judd, supra note
32.
55. See Letter from Joan Hankin, JD, Regulatory Review Officer, Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications, Food and Drug Administration, to Mary
Jane Nehring, Director of Worldwide Regulatory Affairs, Schering Corporation (Mar. 14,
2000) (citing the makers of Claritin for using images of loose hay flying around the actors'
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A recent study done by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that forty-
four percent of patients who asked their physician for a medication they
had seen advertised on television received a prescription for that drug.56
Another segment of the study consisted of 1,872 volunteers, three-
quarters of whom were each shown one of three prescription drug com-
mercials.57 Immediately after watching the advertisements, the majority
of the viewers agreed they gained knowledge about the benefits and side
effects of the medications as opposed to those volunteers who did not
watch the commercials.58 However, the gain was not substantial - ap-
proximately sixty percent of those who viewed the advertisements said
they knew little or nothing more about the medications in general, and
seventy percent claimed to know little or nothing more about the condi-
tions the medications were used to treat.59 Based on the results of this
study, it appears that the messages being sent by pharmaceutical compa-
nies and the messages being received by consumers are not translating
appropriately.
The increase in direct-to-consumer drug advertising over the last
couple of decades, including the fact that almost every pharmaceutical
company has engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising,60 is valid proof
that significant profit gains for the drug industry result from this direct
marketing practice of consumer manipulation.
61
V. DRUG PATENTS
"There is no economic value in conferring a patent monopoly except
for an invention that will have a significant impact. 61
-John H. Barton
A drug receives a patent, granted by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, for a period of twenty years beginning when the appli-
faces in the maker's commercial for Claritin as a false presentation of the drug's efficacy);
Judd, supra note 32.
56. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF Di-
RECI'-TO-CONSUMER PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISING 3, at Chart 2 (2001).
57. See id. at 3 (amounting to a total of 13% of there overall population).
58. See id. at 7.
59. See id.
60. Tyler & Cooper, supra note 22, at 1096.
61. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1455 (stating that pharmaceutical industry's
"manipulation of both consumer risk perceptions and physician prescribing behavior
presents manufacturers with a significant opportunity for gain.").
62. John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 Sci. 1933, 1933 (2000).
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cation for the patent is filed.6 3 This intellectual property protection al-
lows the pharmaceutical company that owns the drug patent the right to
exclude competitors from marketing and selling the same molecularly
structured drug during that twenty-year period of time.6 4 Unfortunately,
pharmaceutical companies have been able to find methods of extending
their dominant drugs' patent lives by fifty percent or more.65 One of the
most significant pitfalls of this extension of years is the continued high
cost required of consumers for a brand name drug while the makers of
the drug pocket the large profits.66 By preventing and delaying the entry
of generic competition, each lengthened patent term requires that con-
sumers pay three times more for a brand name drug than they would for
the generic equivalent.67
In general, pharmaceutical manufacturers concentrate their advertising
budget on newer drugs or drugs that are young in patent years. 68 Phar-
maceutical companies have little to gain from advertising a product
whose patent is about to expire, as generic equivalents create too much
price competition. 69 An example of a pharmaceutical company strategiz-
ing to keep its major share of the antidepressant market is Forest Labora-
tories' introduction of its "new" drug Lexapro. 70 Lexapro is not a new
drug, but a reformulated version of Forest's blockbuster antidepressant
Celexa. 7' Lexapro's introduction occurred well before Celexa was due to
lose its patent.72 Forest is expected to market Lexapro by encouraging
physicians to switch patients on Celexa to Lexapro. As Celexa is respon-
sible for seventy percent of Forest's total sales, it is important to establish
Lexapro before generic competitors are able acquire their share of the
market with generic versions of Celexa.7 3
There are other exceptions to the principle that the pharmaceutical in-
dustry tends to avoid direct-to-consumer advertising of drugs with patents
63. See NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND)
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN ACCESS
AND INNOVATION 4 (2000).
64. Id. at 1, 4.
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id.
67. See GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG FACTS AND
FIGURES, available at http://www.gphaonline.org/news/facts.phtml (last visited Feb. 21,
2003).
68. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 3, at 501.
69. See id. at 503.
70. Petersen, supra note 1.
71. See id. (revealing that Forest was able to distinguish the therapeutic benefit of
Lexapro from Celexa in only one study, a study that Forest had to pay to have published).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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due to expire. One instance is when a pharmaceutical manufacturer has
received approval from the FDA for a new indication for a drug already
on the market."4 What this means is that a drug that has been on the
market for the treatment of one disease is later approved for the treat-
ment of another disease, thus creating a new niche for the exploitation of
the drug.75 One example is the drug Paxil, originally indicated for the
treatment of depression. Recently, Paxil was approved for the treatment
of social anxiety disorder,76 extending the drug's patent- and advertising-
life for an additional term.
The use of heavy direct-to-consumer advertising of a drug that is near-
ing the end of its patent but has a new indication is likely designed to
accomplish two things. One is preventing loyal users of the drug from
switching to an inexpensive generic.77 Another goal may be to gain a
competitive edge over other drugs in the same class.78 Doing so is criti-
cal, because drug companies rely on patent rights for the profits that
trade name drugs bring.79 It is with FDA approval and a valid patent that
a drug company is allowed to "lawfully exercise its monopoly rights and
reign as the sole producer of a particular drug until the patent expires and
generic manufacturers enter the market."8 ° In 1997, ninety percent of the
total amount of money spent on the sale of prescription drugs in the
United States was spent on brand name drugs, equaling over $64 billion
dollars.8 This enormous amount of potential profit makes clear the fi-
nancial incentives drug companies have to extend a brand name drug's
patent life, whether it be by reformulating the drug into different versions
or advertising the brand name drug to develop a barrier against generic
82recognition.
Indications are the diseases or disorders that a drug has been approved
to treat; for example, Paxil CR is "indicated" for the treatment of major
depression and panic disorders in it prescribing information.83 Indication
74. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 3, at 503.
75. See id. at 505.
76. See id. at 503.
77. See generally id.
78. See generally id.
79. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 231 (2001).
80. Id.
81. See Marcia Angell, The Pharmaceutical Industry: To Whom Is It Accountable?, 342
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1903 (2000).
82. See Glasgow, supra note 79, at 233 (listing the means by which drug companies
attempt to extend drug patent lives, including legislative provisions and loopholes, suing
for generic patent infringement, and merging with direct competitors in an effort to extend
the monopoly).
83. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, PAXIL CR PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (2002).
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add-ons extend a drug's patent life, helping a pharmaceutical company to
avert the financial calamity of generic drugs replacing its one-time block-
buster product.84 Because a drug's period of patent protection begins
before development is completed, as many as five or more years of its
protected years are essentially lost." By the time the drug hits the mar-
ket, drug companies are protected from generic competition for only
about twelve years of the initial twenty.86 It is this loss in profit time that
leads drug companies to find ways of extending a drug's moneymaking
years.87
A recent example of a class action challenge against a drug manufac-
turer for illegally monopolizing a sector of the antibiotic market is the
lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline, the maker's of the antibiotic Augmen-
tin, filed on September 19, 2002.88 The filing of this lawsuit came a week
before GlaxoSmithKline received FDA approval for Augmentin XR, a
reformulated version of the initial drug.89 As one of its biggest selling
products, GlaxoSmithKline developed the extended release version of
Augmentin with the purpose of staving off generic competition.9" Glax-
oSmithKline's expectation that the reformulated version of the antibiotic
would be approved by the FDA prior to the drug's patent expiration was
shattered when the approval came after the drug's patent expired, which
occurred in July of 2002, leaving the original version of Augmentin to face
generic competition for two months prior to its reformulation hitting the
market.9 GlaxoSmithKline hopes to prevent generic competition by
challenging a court ruling holding that Augmentin XR's patent is
invalid.92
84. See Elyse Tanouye & Robert Langreth, Time's Up: With Patents Expiring on Big
Prescriptions, Drug Industry Quakes; Top Firms Gird for Onslaught from Generics, Scram-
ble to Develop New Products; Bet on Fewer Blockbusters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1997, at
Al.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. (discussing the impact that generic drugs have on the once-patent-pro-
tected drugs they now compete against, often resulting in the original drug companies'
consolidation with other manufacturers due to the financial losses suffered at the expense
of generic products).
88. See Press Release, Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP, Goodkind
Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP Announces Class Action Against Drug-Maker GlaxoS-
mithKline (Sept. 19, 2002), at http://www.glrs.com/index.cfm?upv=2&getGloballD=23446
(last visited April 15, 2003).
89. See FDA Approves Sale of New Glaxo Drug, WALL ST. J. (LoNDON), Sept. 27,
2002, at B5, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3407218.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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In addition, GlaxoSmithKline is introducing another version of Aug-
mentin: pediatric Augmentin ES, which has a patent of its own. 93 If suc-
cessful, the drug company will have again covered different aspects of the
same antibiotic, resulting in a cycle of new patents coming to life as old
patents are put to rest. 94 The result is that Augmentin will have a patent
life nearly fifteen years beyond what patent regulations intended, origi-
nally to expire at the end of 20029' and now remaining covered until
2017.96 And each new patent extension granted for Augmentin is based
on research strategically done thirty years ago, not research done for an
innovative and new treatment.97
The antibiotic Augmentin is marketed for the treatment of respiratory
infections that have become resistant to other treatments.98 It is logical
to assume that consumer-patients would appreciate the choice of paying
for a generic version of Augmentin, especially after having already paid
for other failed treatments. In the lawsuit against GlaxoSmithKline, the
complainants allege unjust competitive practices and assert that patients
should be able to access appropriate drugs at the lowest cost feasible,
especially if a drug has lived its brand name life and is at the point of
generic competition.99 Representatives of the class action contend that
patients should not have to choose between paying for necessities like
clothing and heat and purchasing needed prescription medications be-
cause of drug companies' persistent efforts to keep expensive drugs from
exiting their monopolies.' 00 The cost to consumers is overwhelming
when one realizes the potential savings generic drugs can provide. For
example, Claritin costs $85 a month compared to a generic equivalent
which will cost $10 a month once Claritin's patent expires.' 01
93. See id.
94. See Glasgow, supra note 79, at 231-33.
95. See U.S. Patent No. 4,529,720 (issued July 16, 1985), available at WL U.S. PAT
4529720; see also GLAXOSMiTHKLINE, AUGMENTIN ES-600, PRESCRIBING INFORMATION
(2002).
96. See David Pilling & Richard Wolffe, Drug Abuses: As Pharmaceutical Companies
Go to Extraordinary Lengths to Protect Expiring Patents, Regulators are Starting to Pay
Close Attention, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 20, 2000, available at http://search.ft.com/
search/articles.html (site access requires subscription) (last visited March 15, 2003).
97. See id.
98. See FDA Approves Sale of New Glaxo Drug, supra note 89.
99. See Press Release, Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP, supra note 88.
100. See id.
101. See Glasgow, supra note 79, at 236.
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The strategy of staggering patents over a period of time has enabled
drug manufacturers like GlaxoSmithKline to "layer" a drug's patents. 0 2
By patenting various aspects of a drug, manufacturers can barricade ge-
neric equivalents from entering the market by initiating patent litigation
as needed. 10 3 Another line of attack is the marketing tool of using old
drugs disguised as new.'0 4 Thus, if a drug manufacturer is able to time
the presentation "of a new use, such as a more convenient dosing form, to
coincide with the expiration of the 'mother' drug's patent," it can extend
its original patent franchise in incremental steps, for a period lasting as
long as eighteen additional years.105
Applied to the situation of Augmentin XR, GlaxoSmithKline was able
to demonstrate to the FDA that the new version of Augmentin was
equally effective as the original at treating its indicated infections, but the
new version had the additional quality of preventing the drug's enzymatic
breakdown in the body."0 6 If generic drug companies are able to prove
that brand name drug companies knew of a drug's "improved" formula-
tion and sat on the information until the new version of the drug could be
used as ammunition against generic patent infringement, the generic
manufacturers may eventually provide consumers with a choice in drugs
at a sooner time. 0 7
In the realm of direct-to-consumer advertising, a drug company's use of
patent extensions allows the makers of a newer version of an old drug to
extend a drug's monopoly in marketing and advertising years. This pro-
vides pharmaceutical manufacturers with the opportunity to impress on
consumers their drug's brand name for a longer period of time, and per-
haps create in the consumer-patient the resistance to switch to and be-
lieve in the efficacy of a generic equivalent when the time arises.' 0 8 This
resistance to change may be influenced either by the life-enhancing
images portrayed in a drug's advertisements or to a patient's inability to
102. See Stephen S. Hall, The Claritin Effect; Prescription for Profit, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 11, 2001, at 40, available at http://query.nytimes.com (site access requires sub-.
scription) (last visited March 20, 2003).
103. See id.; Glasgow, supra note 79, at 248.
104. See Glasgow, supra note 79, at 248.
105. See NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., supra note 63, at 11.
106. See Robert Langreth & Victoria Murphy, Perennial Patents, FORBES, Apr. 2,
2001, at 52, available at 2001 WL 2184224 (discussing Pfizer's epilepsy drug, Neurontin,
which relied on an extended released version like Augmentin to extend the drug's patent
life).
107. See id.
108. See Glasgow, supra note 79, at 252 (stating that a brand name drug's extended
coverage in the direct-to-consumer market may discourage generics from entering the
market).
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put a price on good health."°9 A consumer's resistance to switch to a
generic drug is likely a combination of several factors. The bottom line,
though, is that it is the brand name manufacturers who choose the price
at which to sell their drugs,"' and it is they who seek to prolong the
drugs' profits for an excessively long period of time.
VI. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
"The conflict between the learned intermediary rule and the increased
deference to the consumer's right to know leaves courts in somewhat
of a quandary.""'1
The learned intermediary doctrine has been a tort liability tool for
nearly fifty years. 112 The doctrine, created by the court in Marcus v. Spe-
cific Pharmaceuticals,"3 was established with the purpose of shielding
drug manufacturers from liability for failure to warn claims brought by
patient-recipients of their products, because the medication was only
available to the consumer through a physician's prescription.' 14 The rea-
soning behind this theory is that drug manufacturers sell their goods to
physicians who are responsible to the patients for whom they prescribe
medications." 5
Based on the principles of tort liability, pharmaceutical manufacturers
have been designated as producers of "unavoidably unsafe" products." 16
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
"There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
109. See Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act:
The Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 91, 92 (2002) (discussing the high cost of pharmaceutical drugs and the multiple factors
behind drug prices).
110. See id.
111. James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement
of the Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in Favor of Abandoning it Entirely, 36
TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 120 (2000).
112. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (creating the
term "learned intermediary doctrine" to establish the role of the doctor between a patient
and a prescription drug manufacturer).
113. 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948).
114. See Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div.
1948) (holding a manufacturer of suppositories not liable for the death of a child resulting
from an overdose administered by prescription of physician, as the manufacturer made no
claims directed at the patient).
115. Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 111, at 119-20.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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drugs... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warnings, is not defective, nor is it unreasona-
bly dangerous... The seller of such products, again with the qualifi-
cation that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an ap-
parently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk. 117
On the same note, the FDA defines a prescription drug as one that
cannot be made completely safe due to its potential for harmful side ef-
fects. 118 The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability also place responsibility on consumers and
physicians, who are held to assume the potentially harmful risks associ-
ated with the use of pharmaceuticals." 9 This risk is usually undertaken
because of the higher benefit-to-risk ratio the drug may provide a particu-
lar patient.12 0 On the other hand, pharmaceutical manufacturers are not
strictly liable for the side effects caused by their products, so long as they
do not act negligently in failing to warn the prescribing physicians of the
dangers about which they knew or should have known. 121 The general
rule also holds that even though a drug manufacturer is aware that the
medical community is failing to inform its patients of risks associated with
the use of its product, a manufacturer should not be straddled with the
responsibility either. 122 This rule is based on the principle that a doctor is
not required to inform a patient of all a drug's possible side effects. l23 It
is the duty of the pharmaceutical companies to provide the prescribing
physicians with adequate warnings and information about the drug prod-
117. Id.
118. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2000) (de-
fining a prescription drug as a "drug intended for use by man which ... because of its
toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect . . . is not safe for use except under the
supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug").
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1998).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
121. Id.
122. See generally Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 400 So.2d 820 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the manufacturers of prescription steroid drugs, who knew or
should have known of the failure of physicians to warn patients of the drugs' potentially
harmful side effects, were under no duty to inform the patients as the ultimate consumers).
123. Id. at 824.
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ucts so that doctors, as the learned intermediaries, can safely prescribe
and inform their patients regarding risks and benefits. 1
4
The responsibility given to the physician who prescribes a drug is not
intended to remove or shield a pharmaceutical manufacturer from any or
all product liability, but to shift a complex transaction to the most quali-
fied dispenser of the product.'2 5 The court in Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries1 26 best illuminates this principle:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in
formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physi-
cian can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the
susceptibilities of his patient. His is a task of weighing the benefits of any
medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an in-
formed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowl-
edge of both patient and palliative. 27
The increase in drug advertisements directed at the consumer has cre-
ated a divided stand on the issue of proposed reform of the learned inter-
mediary rule.' 28  Since the doctrine's inception, courts have been
reluctant to impose liability on prescription drug manufacturers, realizing
the potential of expanding liability to the point of invalidating its pur-
pose. 129 To date, only a handful of direct-to-consumer campaigns have
resulted in pharmaceutical manufacturer liability, all of which involved
situations in which the physician-patient relationship was non-existent or
nearly so. For example, a handful of courts have imposed pharmaceutical
manufacturer liability in the harmful aftermath of the mass administra-
124. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 1973) (commenting
that the learned intermediary doctrine, requiring that the physician be provided with the
appropriate warnings in order to relay the drug warnings to the patient, is the most effec-
tive way to keep the patient informed).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998) (stating
that medical professionals are in the best position to assess and determine the advantages
and disadvantages of prescription drug therapy on an individualized patient basis).
126. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. See Monica Renee Matter, Emerging DTC Advertising of Prescription Drugs and
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 79, 88 (2002).
129. See Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jefferson, Some Accurate Information is Better
than No Information at All: Arguments Against Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine Based on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 78 OR. L. REV. 605, 623-24 (1999) (as-
serting that the creation of exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine would result in
consumers paying the ultimate cost of such exceptions).
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tion of vaccines,'130 and the use of oral contraceptives13 1 and contracep-
tive devices. 132
The Eighth Circuit has also declared the occurrence of excessive phar-
maceutical direct-to-consumer advertisements to be soft ground for im-
posing tort liability on drug manufacturers. 133 In Hill v. Searle
Laboratories,'3 4 the Court of Appeals addressed the over-promotion of
an implantable intrauterine device that resulted in harm to a patient.135
The court found Searle liable for the cost of the consumer's injury, find-
ing that the drug manufacturer's mass-marketing scheme generated an
aggressive impression of a high quality product, diluted the risks involved
with the device's use, and diminished the physician's ability to determine
the product's appropriateness for the requesting patient.
136
Aside from the above exceptions, the learned intermediary doctrine
continues to be upheld, insulating drug companies from liability. The ju-
dicial system's adherence to the learned intermediary doctrine is sensible,
assuming that legislation is enacted to control and limit the means by
which pharmaceutical manufacturers advertise to consumers. This pre-
mise is well stated by Richard C. Ausness in his article on this issue. Aus-
ness believes "it is better to discourage unethical and dangerous
marketing practices by industry self-regulation, or if necessary by govern-
ment regulation, than to create new, and potentially open-ended, forms
of tort liability.' 137 Yet, critics of the learned intermediary doctrine con-
tinue to argue that pharmaceutical companies should be held to the same
regulations and penalties as other sellers who advertise to the general
public. 138
130. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1968) (con-
tracting polio from polio vaccination given during mass vaccination program); Reyes, 498
F.2d at 1269 (administering mass vaccination program for polio), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1975); Petty
v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984) (administering mass vaccination pro-
gram for swine flu).
131. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass. 1985) (imposing
liability on a manufacturer of oral contraceptive for plaintiff's resulting stroke, as the court
held that the use of birth control is often a decision not requiring ongoing physician
contact).
132. See Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the direct-to-consumer promotion of an intrauterine device required presentation of
the risks of use, distinguishable from most prescription drug products, as contraceptive
practices are often not medical in nature).
133. Id.
134. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1070.
136. Id. at 1070-71.
137. Ausness, supra note 30, at 99.
138. Id. at 122-23.
THE SCHOLAR
VII. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AS EVIDENCE OF SUCCESSFUL, BUT
DEADLY, MARKET MANIPULATION
"A [fact]: Science Advances New Data That May Completely Change
Your Ideas of Cigarettes."'139
An empty scientific assertion made by
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, aimed at
deflecting consumer perceptions of health
risks associated with smoking.14 °
In recent history, the tobacco industry has experienced an unprece-
dented amount of litigation on the issue of product liability related to the
industry's intensive marketing, advertising, and promoting strategies,
which are alleged to have left consumers inadequately informed of the
dangerous side-effects of tobacco use.141 Based on the lengthy research
of Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, the legal theorists have carefully
examined the tobacco industry's success at manipulating consumers
through marketing strategies and the subsequent liability the industry has
had to face in court.142 As a result of the extensive litigation and ensuing
policy changes, the discovery of a tremendous amount of documentation
and evidence regarding the tobacco industry's knowledge of the risks as-
sociated with the use of tobacco has become available.' 43 The result, ac-
cording to the aforementioned legal scholars, is that the history of
tobacco industry market manipulation is proof that "manufacturer ma-
nipulation not only occurs, but also succeeds.' 144
Prior to legislative limits imposed on cigarette advertising, few con-
sumer products have been the subject of such a vast array and amount of
advertising as have tobacco products.145 According to Allan Brandt, the
cigarette is a phenomenon that would not have become so much a part of
American culture as it has if not for the efforts of the industry in "corpo-
rate capitalism, technology, mass marketing, and, in particular, the impact
139. RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 87 (1996).
140. Id.
141. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1467-68; but see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D.
Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Facto Incentive-Based Reg-
ulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1181-83 (1998).
142. See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29 (providing an in-depth analysis of
products liability and manufacturers' manipulation of consumers' product risk
perceptions).
143. Id. at 1470.
144. Id. at 1469-70.
145. Id. at 1470-71.
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of advertising." '146 Cigarette advertisements reflected persons who used
tobacco as being powerful and independent, thus shifting the focus away
from the cigarette's risks and toward the psychological empowerment of
the viewer who purchased the product. 147
Resembling pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertisements, ciga-
rette advertisements portrayed desirable, life-affirming traits, such as in-
dependence and sexuality. 148 For example, the well-known and now-
famous Marlboro Man reflected onto consumers the experience of adven-
ture and freedom with the use of Marlboro cigarettes; consumers without
the effective advertisements would most likely not have perceived these
abstract emotions.149 The tobacco industry's goal of increasing market
share profits was based on targeting and swaying young non-smokers, pri-
marily with the marketing strategy of health-focused advertisements, ap-
parently filled with deceit. 5 ° The Marlboro Man was not alone in the
advertisement strategy aimed at attracting young, long-term cigarette
smokers - remember the "smooth character" and "quintessential party
animal" Joe Camel?15' In a 1989 testimonial addressed to Congress, the
model hired to portray the "Winston Man" for the manufacturer of Win-
ston brand cigarettes stated:
I was clearly told that young people were the market that we were
going after. . . It was made clear to us that this image was important
because kids like to role play, and we were to provide the attractive role
models for them to follow. I was told I was a live version of the GI
Joe.15
2
The beginning of voluminous tobacco litigations began in 1994, when
Mississippi filed the first state action against big tobacco, and the state of
Florida passed the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act. 15 3 This step by
the Florida legislature permitted plaintiffs to introduce and rely on mar-
ket-share liability, thus stripping the tobacco industry of all its common-
146. Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette, Risk, and American Culture, 119 DAEDALUS 155,
157 (1990).
147. Id.
148. See id. (pointing out cigarette advertising was so effective because it "pointed
away from the product toward the moral and psychological power" of the consumer).
149. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1471.
150. Id. at 1470-71.
151. KLUGER, supra note 139, at 701.
152. See Hollywood Unions Sue Tobacco Companies, AcTION ON SMOKING AND
HEALTH, Nov. 27, 1997, at http://www.no-smoking.org/nov97/11-27-97-3.html (last visited
April 14, 2003).
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
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law affirmative defenses.154 By 1997, lawsuits against tobacco manufac-
turers had reached more than forty states, resulting in numerous fraud,
negligence, and product liability claims of multi-million dollars amounts,
and plaintiffs and prosecutors armed at every level of government.1 55
The State of California lifted its moratorium on tobacco litigation, the
outcome of which resulted in a losing streak for Philip Morris in four
California jury verdicts.' 56 The most recent of the four punitive damage
awards imposed against Philip Morris by a California jury totaled $28
billion.'5 7 Jurors determined that Philip Morris concealed the health
risks associated with smoking and negligently designed its cigarettes.158
Although the California courts imposed excessively high judgments
against the tobacco industry, the message resulting from the verdicts sug-
gests just how ubiquitous and unobservable market manipulation can be
and the need for manufacturer liability.' 59
This comment is not intended to suggest that prescription drugs are as
inherently dangerous as cigarettes and other tobacco products.' 60 The
purpose of addressing tobacco manufacturer liability is the correlation
that the tobacco and pharmaceutical industries have used in their empha-
sis on direct-to-consumer advertising. Of particular significance is the im-
pact that the marketing tactics of cigarette advertisements had on juries,
including cigarette advertisements' emphasis on the improved quality of
life that smoking could provide, and the minimization and camouflaging
of the product's side effects.
154. See Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic,
and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1147
(2001).
155. See id. at 1148-49.
156. See generally Gordon Fairclough, Despite New Legal Tactic, Philip Morris Is
Burned by Jury, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at A19, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3407987.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 6, at 290-91.
160. See Bryan Christopher Moody, Prescription Medication and Consumer Protec-
tion: A Time for Reform, 5 J. OHIo N. U. J. PHARMACY & L. 19, 19 (1995) (estimating that
more than 125,000 American fatalities result annually due to the taking of prescription
medications).
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VII. WHAT HAS THE LEGISLATURE DONE?
"There's a page of mouse tracks that I swear to God, with my eyes, I
can't read."'61
-Rep. Pete Start, D-Cal.,
referring to the fine print product information,
flashed on the television screen, required of
prescription drug commercials. 162
Consumers are vulnerable to the advertising strategies of pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers who are deemed to be experts in their field; in particu-
lar, less-educated members of society and those unsophisticated in the
fields of science and medicine are especially susceptible to the exploita-
tion of pharmaceutical advertisements.' 63
In 1979, the FDA proposed a regulation requiring that manufacturers
of prescription drugs include a patient package insert - a consumer-di-
rected informational about the drug.' 64 The platform for the regulation
was the FDA's conviction that the learned intermediary doctrine had re-
sulted in an inadequate, single-source information system that left the pa-
tient-consumer with insufficient knowledge of a drug's use and safety
profile. 165 The FDA provided support for the bill by demonstrating that
the patient's physician, during a doctor's visit, normally gives the patient
instructions for the administration of the prescription drug on a one-time
verbal basis; the patient is often anxious, ill, and eager to leave the
setting.166
161. Rubin, supra note 28.
162. Id.
163. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1424-25 (arguing "because individuals exhibit
systematic and persistent cognitive process that depart from axioms of rationality, they are
susceptible to manipulation by those actors in position to influence the decision making
context").
164. Prescription Drug Products; Patient Labeling Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 44194
(Aug. 24, 1995) (basing the regulations on several considerations, including studies of the
effectiveness of patient package inserts and the safe and effective use of prescription
drugs).
165. See Donald Kennedy, Remarks of the Commissioner, 32 FOoD DRUG CosM. L.J.
384, 386-87 (1977) (commenting on patient package inserts which raise the "quality of dis-
course between patient and physician, eliminates unfounded apprehension, increases com-
pliance, and draws the patient into active participation in working to solve problems").
166. See Barbara Marticelli McGarey, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-
Directed Information - Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U. L.
REV. 117, 134-35 (1984) (noting that the FDA recommended that a "written source of
information that the patient can read and refer to continuously would be an effective
means of reinforcing the information given by the physician and [serve] as a standing re-
minder to the patient of the proper purposes and use of the prescribed drug").
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Opposition to the patient package insert regulation overcame its enact-
ment, as various pharmaceutical and medical groups argued that the pa-
tient package inserts would not serve the public's interest.167 The
opponents to the legislations based their argument on the package inserts
interference with the physician-patient relationship; the inability of the
drug manufacturer to include all of the drug's relevant safety and side-
effect information; the fear caused the patient by the attention to the
risks involved with the drug's use, and the resulting discontinuation of the
treatment.
168
Despite the FDA's loosening of its reins around the pharmaceutical
industry's neck, the fact remains that the sale of prescription drugs is a
highly regulated business, both in terms of research and development and
advertising and distribution. The FDA, not the courts, should govern the
prescription drug industry when it comes to what information is relayed
to the public.
Current systems for regulating marketing, excluding the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and other manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products,
have veered away from command-and-control rules and toward incen-
tive-based systems. 169 Command-and-control rules require manufactur-
ers or enterprises to abide by regulations developed for their industry,
putting most of the regulatory control in the hands of policy makers.170
At the other end of the liability spectrum is the incentive-based system.
Incentive-based rules force industries to internalize the costs of product-
accidents, thus leaving manufacturers with the responsibility of taking
precautions to adequately inform the consumer of the product's risks or
else assume the costs associated with the resulting harm.1 71 Many ana-
lysts consider the incentive-based system to be superior because it oper-
ates at the profit level of manufacturer motivation. 17  Further, they
follow the principle that market regulation should not be placed in the
hands of outside regulators who must then identify and direct efficient
market outcomes.173
As for drug patent abuse and the erection of barriers to generic drugs
entering the market, past legislation has done little to remove the poten-
167. See id. at 135.
168. Statement of Policy Concerning Oral Contraceptive Labeling Directed to Users,
35 Fed. Reg. 9001 (June 11, 1970).
169. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 6, at 267.
170. Id. at 267-68.
171. Id. at 268.
172. Id. at 267-68, 294.
173. Id.
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tial for abuse allowed by current patent laws. 74 However, steps have
recently been taken by the current administration to limit the amount of
patent extensions a drug maker may pursue in an effort to increase con-
sumer access to generic drugs.1 75 In 2003, President Bush proposed a
plan to make changes in patent law protection rules by limit the number
of times a brand name drug maker can extend a patent to a one time
automatic 30-month stay once a generic drug application is filed.1 76 This
one time extension would allow a patent holder to challenge a generic
competitor, while restricting a brand name drug maker from acquiring
new patents for the existing drug based on "new packing methods, for
intermediate forms of the drug, or for 'metabolites' - substances the drug
changes into inside the body."' 77 In other words, the administration ap-
pears to be seeking to eliminate the use of drug fine-tuning used by many
of the makers of blockbuster brand name drugs currently on the market,
all with the purpose of lengthening the drug's patent security from ge-
neric competition.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT THE LEGISLATURE CAN Do
"[A]I1 the logic of economic theory tells us that manufacturers will
manipulate consumer perception in the direction that benefits them
most - toward the underestimation of product risks. And all the evi-
dence of consumer product markets suggests that this manipulation
has been successful and will continue to be so until policymakers
take behavioralism as seriously as marketers do."' 78
A. FDA Regulations
The financial success that direct-to-consumer drug advertising has had
for the pharmaceutical industry makes fairly obvious the realization that
such marketing campaigns cannot be completely reversed. The goal,
therefore, must be to succeed at creating guidelines for the pharmaceuti-
174. See James T. O'Reilly, Prescription Pricing and Monopoly Extension: Elderly
Drug Users Lose the Shell Game of Post-Patent Exclusivity, 29 N. Ky. L. REv. 413, 413-14
(2002).
175. See Randall Mikkelsen, Bush to Seek Lower-Cost Generic Drugs, NEWS SENTI-
NEL (FORT WAYNE), Oct. 20, 2002, available at http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssenti-
nel/4330368.htm (stating that President Bush, on Oct. 21, 2002, would propose new
regulations aimed at limiting drug patent holders to a one-time extension to be used during
a patent challenge) (author's note: Bush did indeed introduce such regulation) (last visited
April 21, 2003).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1572.
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cal industry that guarantee honest and appropriate information be por-
trayed in drug advertisements aimed at consumers.' 79  Ideally,
prescription drug advertisements should be in the form of public service
announcements, in the framework of public education.18°
The FDA must eliminate the current retrospective review process for
drug commercials, which allows the consumer to be influenced by a drug
commercial before the FDA and the medical community has had the op-
portunity to verify its accuracy. 81  As recommended by the American
College of Physicians and the American Society of Internal Medicine, the
pharmaceutical industry should be required by FDA guidelines to consult
with a panel of physicians and the medical community regarding a pro-
spective drug advertising campaign. 18' This will help to eliminate the
negative impact on the patient-physician relationship that drug advertise-
ments may have by allowing physicians to feel confident regarding the
information their patients are receiving.' 83
In the field of medicine and healthcare, courts have relied on the the-
ory of a patient's right to informed consent when it comes to a person's
right to accept or reject a treatment offered to him or her.184 As the
information in this comment has illustrated, pharmaceutical drug com-
mercials are not required to portray all of the advertised drug's side ef-
fects, only the most common. This lack of an accurate risk-to-benefit
presentation of a drug to the consumer public appears to contradict the
179. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF IN-
TERNAL MEDICINE, DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1-2
(1998), available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/pospaper/dtcads.htm (last visited on Apr.
10, 2003) (stating that although the American College of Physicians and the American
Society of Internal Medicine continue to maintain that prescription drugs are not an appro-
priate product to be marketed directly to consumers, the fact remains that such advertise-
ments are here to stay, and therefore require more stringent guidelines).
180. See id. at 2 (holding that the American College of Physicians and the American
Society of Internal Medicine do not believe that product promotion has a role in prescrip-
tion drug advertisements, only education).
181. Id. at 7-8.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id.
184. See Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1984); Cantebury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-82 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 298-
300 (1st Cir. 2002). The elements of the doctrine of informed consent are:
(1) the existence of a material risk unknown to the patient;
(2) the failure to disclose the risk;
(3) that had the risk been disclosed the patient would have chosen a different course;
and
(4) resulting injury.
Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522.
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"traditional principles of informed consent."' 85 The FDA can strive to
implement regulations on the pharmaceutical industry requiring prescrip-
tion drug marketing directed at consumers to protect the public by por-
traying accurate and complete information regarding a drug's risks and
benefits, in language that the lay public can comprehend and analyze. If
a drug manufacturer is unable to comply with the required standards nec-
essary to provide the targeted consumer with the full range of informa-
tion necessary to make an informed decision whether or not to pursue a
prescription for the drug, the pharmaceutical company offending the reg-
ulations must face the revocation of the right to advertise the product.
As consideration for what a pharmaceutical manufacturer should be re-
quired to include in a drug commercial regarding the risks and side ef-
fects associated with the product's use, the FDA should devise a
"standard percentile [at] and above" which all side effects occurring dur-
ing the research and clinical trial phase for the drug be presented to the
consumer. 186
B. Drug Patents
The drug industry's practice of extending a blockbuster drug's patent
life by tweaking the original drug should be tempered. The drug manu-
facturers' ability to take advantage of loopholes in the patent system and
solidify their drugs' exclusive market position appears to be limitless.
Legislation to increase competition in the drug market is needed. Such
action will result in the moderation of prices through the introduction of
generic drug equivalents. Brand name drug prices will not be lowered
unless generic drugs are allowed to enter the market. However, that
competition is legally barred until a brand name drug loses its
monopoly.187
One potential solution: the United States Patent and Trademark Office
can eliminate existing loopholes in the drug patent system. This would
create a drug patent effective for twenty years, with extensions allowed
for only very specific reasons. This legislation would allow patent exten-
sions for highly select drug innovations made to drugs already under pat-
ent. At the same time, the extension clauses should clearly explain any
narrow exceptions in order to prevent abuse of the system and eliminate
unfair monopolization of the market. In particular, this legislation must
185. See Holtz, supra note 20, at 215.
186. See id. at 216.
187. See FAMILIES USA, Profiting from Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go 15
(2002), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/ppreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2003)
(stating that it is the price of generic drugs, often sold at half of the cost of brand name
equivalents, that will cause the needed moderation in prescription drug prices).
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be aimed at preventing drug companies from seeking to knock-off one of
their successful drugs already on the market. Drug manufacturers might
then have to devote more time and resources to genuine research and
development, instead of taking the easier route to increasing profits for
drugs that have already cornered their fair share of the market.
C. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and The Pharmaceutical
Industry's Duty to Assume Liability
A final recommendation for pharmaceutical drug advertisements di-
rected at consumers involves the evaluation of the effectiveness (or inef-
fectiveness) of the learned intermediary doctrine. As the above
discussion of the tobacco industry's liability demonstrates, a manufac-
turer's liability to consumers may be based on the manufacturer's manip-
ulation of the product's risks, which may easily be downplayed through
strategic marketing tactics. The lesson that the pharmaceutical industry
can learn from the tobacco industry's very successful advertising and mar-
keting period is that there is potential for serious financial liability down
the road. Courts may be able to minimize the number of future lawsuits
against pharmaceutical companies related to prescription drug advertise-
ments by replacing the learned intermediary doctrine with an incentive-
based, or market-based, system of analysis. This system would require
the pharmaceutical industry to internalize appropriate costs, instead of
relying on regulations; thus, the pharmaceutical industry will be forced to
evaluate both the positive and negative impact of their advertisements
directed at consumers, all the while remaining aware of the potential for
liability for their actions and failure to act.
188
X. CONCLUSION
The profits that pharmaceutical manufacturers receive as a result of
direct-to-consumer marketing strategies are chilling.189 Drug companies
often blame the high price of prescription drugs on the high cost of re-
search and development, asserting that a reduction in the prices charged
for prescription drugs would have direct negative impact on the drug
company's ability to research and develop new drug therapies. 190 Al-
188. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 6, at 268 (discussing the different forms of enter-
prise liability).
189. See FAMILIES USA, OFF THE CHARTS: PAY, PROFITS AND SPENDING BY DRUG
COMPANIES 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/media/press/2001/drugceos.
htm (last visited April 8, 2003) (finding that the top nine pharmaceutical manufacturers
made profit margins in 2000 that were nearly four times the average Fortune 500
companies).
190. Id. at 1.
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though it takes the creation of an innovative and effectual drug to survive
on the drug market, many of the leading pharmaceutical companies ag-
gressively spend more on advertising, marketing, and administration than
they do on research and development.191 For example, the nine drug
companies responsible for manufacturing the top fifty prescribed drugs
on the market in 2001 spent nearly two-and-one-half times more money
on advertising and administration than was spent on research and devel-
opment. 192 It is this disparity - the vision of the consumer, often strapped
for money, who has to make the choice between prescription drugs and
food or clothing, compared to the blitz of drug advertisements displaying
visuals and words of a life most consumers hope for - that makes the
huge sums of money drug companies pocket each year seem
exasperating.
The high tide of prescription drug advertising presented in the middle
of prime time television and throughout all forms of print media will
likely continue to be targeted at the unsuspecting consumer who sud-
denly feels symptomatic. It would be foolish to believe that pharmaceuti-
cal companies do not deserve to make a profit, as most business ventures
are created with money as the primary goal and motivator. The discovery
of life-saving drugs and cures, as well as the innovation of life-enhancing
drugs, are the admirable social interests the general consumer population
hopes the pharmaceutical industry encompasses. The making of profits
by drug companies should not be used to vilify the industry, yet a capita-
tion on or the redirection of profits to benefit the consumer-in-need ap-
pears not only necessary, but also feasible through legislation imposing
stricter regulations on direct-to-consumer drug advertising and limiting
drug patent extensions, as well as the reevaluation of the learned inter-
mediary doctrine by the judicial system.
191. Id. at 3.
192. FAMILIES USA, NEW 2001 DATA SHOW BIG DRUG COMPANIES SPENT ALMOST
Two-AND-ONE-HALF TIMES AS MUCH ON MARKETING, ADVERTISING, AND ADMINISTRA-
TION AS THEY SPENT ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2001), available at http://www.
familiesusa.org/new2001data.htm (last visited April 8, 2003).

